Moral Decision Theory — In No Uncertain Terms (Part I)

Part 1

Moral Decision
Theory

In No Uncertain Terms


Riley and Anton are friends having a meal at a local café. At the end of their meal, the owner gives them someone else’s bill – it’s for half of the correct amount.

Riley: Well, we could pay this lower amount. And that would clearly be best for us. But all things considered, I actually think we should let them know about the mistake.

Anton: I agree. In moral terms, it’s the best option.

So far, there is no disagreement. The friends tell the owner about the mistake and pay the correct amount. A few weeks later, another discussion occurs.

Anton: Hey. I told some friends about the incorrect bill, and they said we should have just paid the lower amount.

Riley: Ha, really? Well, we’re right and they’re wrong.

Anton: What do you mean by that? Wrong in what sense?

Riley: In the sense they’ve made an error. Like, you’re wrong if you believe the earth is flat. You’re wrong if you believe we should have kept quiet about the mistake.

Anton: Ah. Interesting. I actually disagree. I don’t think there is some moral fact independent of people’s attitudes.

Riley and Anton have discovered that although they agree about reporting the error, they disagree at a deeper level of moral discussion. They disagree about the meaning and status of moral claims.

Riley is a moral realist. She believes that there are moral facts whose truth is independent of personal or cultural attitudes. Anton denies that view. He is a moral anti-realist.

Riley: So then, if there is no objectively correct thing to do, why did you tell the café owner about the mistake?

Anton: Because I value being honest.

Riley: So honesty is good to you, but not to others. But surely honesty would be good even if nobody valued it?

Anton: No, I don’t think so. You can’t have value without a valuer.

Riley: But moral value is different. It refers to an objective or intrinsic value.

Anton: Well, that’s where I disagree. I can make sense of honesty being good relative to my values. What I don’t understand is what could make it good independently of anyone valuing it.

Riley and Anton still agree about their choice. They even share the same positive attitude towards honesty. But they disagree about the nature of moral value.

Riley: But suppose you didn’t value honesty. Suppose paying the lower amount was what you genuinely wanted to do. Aren’t you still obligated to speak up?

Anton: If you’re asking whether there is an objective requirement to act honestly, then no.

Riley: That’s where I disagree. Even if nobody in the world cared about honesty, we’d still have a duty to speak the truth.

Anton: A moral duty to be honest? But why should you comply with that duty?

Riley: Because that’s what a moral duty is. It is binding upon us because of our status as moral agents.

Anton: But then I can just ask the same question again. Why does my status as a moral agent bind me? And if you give me another reason, I can ask why that reason is binding. Whatever answer you give, the question can simply be repeated.

So, who is right? Is morality objective or subjective?

Moral Decision Theory provides an answer to this ancient and important question. It argues that a moral statement such as “We should pay the correct bill” can be true, independent of any personal or cultural attitude.

But Moral Decision Theory walks a different path from many familiar approaches to moral realism.

The first step is to recognise that moral statements can bundle together three distinct claims. A challenge against one may seem to invalidate the package of all three. But they do not need to stand or fall together.

1.1 The Package Deal

Looking closely at Riley’s moral reasoning, we can see three distinct claims.

Value Claim: More honesty is better

Endorsement Claim: Paying the higher amount is the best option, according to a Standard of Honesty.

Authority Claim: We are required to adhere to a Standard of Honesty.

These three claims are revealed separately in her discussion with Anton. But moral discourse often bundles together value, endorsement and authority within a single moral statement. The three claims are treated as a package deal.

A moral statement in the form

“You should do θ”

often assumes, or implies, a trio of

(1) More of Property/Properties X is better

(2) θ is the best option in terms of Standard X

(3) We are required to adhere to Standard X

An objective account of morality can face challenges to (1) and (3). When bundled together in a package, those challenges appear to threaten the entire position.

Moral Decision Theory neither cedes to those challenges nor resolves them. Instead, it claims that (2) in isolation can be

  • Stance-independent
  • Normative
  • Moral, and
  • True

Stance-independence and normativity are the subjects of Part 1. The moral classification of the Endorsement Claim is explained in Part 2. Its truth is introduced in Part 2 and further developed in Part 3.

1.2 Moral Facts without Moral Value

Happiness, life, justice, freedom, dignity, social harmony, security. These are just some of the things that have been claimed to possess moral value. And the question of what is valuable is often a starting point for moral philosophy.

Value claims can concern many different kinds of things: outcomes, states of affairs, actions, behaviours, character traits, and so on. In each case, some feature of the thing is given an evaluative dimension. Happiness may be good. Suffering may be bad. Greater freedom may be better than less freedom, or perhaps only up to a certain point.

While such claims can be made in a variety of contexts, we are specifically concerned with Value Claims in relation to decision making. Once we face a choice, such claims can provide the basis for comparing the available options. If one claims that health is good, then the best option is the one which produces more, or better, health. Suppose promise-keeping is identified as good. That would favour an option which involves keeping a promise over one which involves breaking it. Where loyalty is claimed to be good, an option which exemplifies loyalty ranks above one which does not.

The general structure is the same. A Value Claim attributes positivity or negativity to some property, or set of properties. Those properties can then be used to compare the options in a decision. And from that comparison comes an endorsement: one option is identified as best according to the resulting standard.

But what if that Value Claim is not always required? What if an option can be endorsed on the basis of a certain property, without any prior claim that the property itself is valuable?

This is the route taken by Moral Decision Theory. Rather than defending an account of stance-independent moral value, MDT argues that an option can be endorsed as best without first establishing a separate Value Claim.

1.2.1 An Ordered Decision

Before we can dispense with the Value Claim, we need to understand the work it performs. A helpful starting point is the distinction between an order and a ranking.

Imagine five different objects on a table. There is an order of those objects from heaviest to lightest. That remains true whether or not anyone physically arranges them, weighs them, or even notices them. The order describes a relation between the objects, rather than an activity performed by an observer.

And there is more here than simply an ordering from first to fifth. The similarities and differences between the objects determine where they sit along a scale of mass: some closer together, others further apart.

A scale, as I will use the term, is a dimension along which different entities can be ordered and compared.

The same objects might be ordered along other scales: brightness, age, length, temperature, and so on. Again, these comparisons describe relations between the objects rather than evaluations made by an observer.

It is worth noting that a scale can be a composite of various properties. For example, we could order five animals on a scale of habitat versatility. This scale might combine tolerance for variation in temperature, altitude, humidity, salinity, and so on. Various properties are thus aggregated towards a single dimension.

The same kind of abstract ordering can apply to the options in a decision. Suppose five options differ in the extent to which they conform to prevailing social norms. Once those norms are specified, the options can be ordered along a scale of conformity, from most conformist to least conformist.

As before, the scale provides a dimension along which the options can be compared. But importantly, it does not yet tell us which options are better or worse. It may support a comparative claim in the form:

θ is the highest option on Scale X

That claim is neutral. It is purely descriptive. How do we transition from a highest option to a best option? From an ordering to a ranking?

1.2.2 Goods For Scale

Our five options compared along a scale of social conformity can support the claims Option A is the highest option on a scale of conformity Option B is the lowest option on a scale of conformity

These descriptive claims are independent of any moral theory.

Now consider a moral position which favours tradition and social cohesion. It makes the Value Claim: More conformity is better

A second moral theory favours originality and individual autonomy. It makes the Value Claim: Less conformity is better

The moral theories now enter the discussion. They move us from an ordering scale to a ranking standard.

A standard is a specific type of scale. It is a scale with an orientation from better to worse.1A note on terminology is important here.

Moral Decision Theory does not use the term standard to imply normative authority. A standard is simply a reference by which options can be ordered or ranked. It specifies what counts as higher or lower, better or worse, for the purposes of that comparison.

The existence and content of a standard can therefore be distinguished from any claim that an agent ought to follow it.

The Value Claim determines which direction on the descriptive scale corresponds to better and which to worse. The first moral theory connects those options on the “more conformity” end of the scale to the “better” end of the standard. The second moral theory connects those options on the “less conformity” end of the scale to the “better” end of the standard.

There may be many ways in which a moral theory supplies an evaluative orientation to the underlying scale. It might involve advancing, protecting, preserving, constraining, balancing, or otherwise orienting the properties of the options. This can involve a single property, or a mix of properties aggregated towards a common standard. The key point is that

  • The properties of the options supply an ordering
  • The Value Claim determines how that ordering bears upon a ranking in terms of moral value

The Value Claim is the step in moral reasoning between θ is the highest option on Scale X and θ is the best option in terms of Standard X

So far, this account applies whether the Value Claim is intended as stance-dependent or as stance-independent. In either case, it supplies the evaluative orientation that takes us from an ordering to a ranking.

A stance-independent Value Claim makes an additional assertion: that this evaluative orientation is independent of anyone’s attitudes. It is this claim of stance-independence that faces a direct challenge.

1.2.3 The Value Question

Return to Riley’s claim that honesty is a moral good. Actions taken may be compared to one another along a scale from dishonest to honest. Questions about where particular actions fit along that scale do not depend upon anyone’s moral values or moral beliefs.

But once Riley claims that “honesty is good”, she adds something further. She overlays an evaluative orientation onto the scale.

Importantly, Riley intends this Value Claim to describe an objective fact. She claims that the evaluative relationship between honesty and moral value is independent of any personal, cultural, or hypothetical attitude.

Anton challenges that relationship. He asks a Value Question. What makes one direction on the descriptive scale objectively better than the other? And how can we distinguish an objective relationship from our moral intuitions or sentiments?

This is a familiar challenge posed by moral anti-realists to the objective account of value. And it appears to challenge all three moral claims in the package.

Value Claim: More of Property/Properties X is better

Endorsement Claim: θ is the best option in terms of Standard X

Authority Claim: We are required to adhere to Standard X

The Value Claim supplies the evaluative orientation of the standard embedded within each of the Endorsement and the Authority Claim. If the standard itself depends upon a stance-dependent Value Claim, then the entire package appears contaminated at its source.

We can structure the argument as follows

(1) Each standard requires a Value Claim to provide its orientation from better to worse.

(2) Every Value Claim depends upon the attitudes or evaluative stance of an individual, group or culture.

(3) Therefore, every moral claim whose truth depends upon such a standard is itself stance-dependent.

One response to the argument is to accept the premises and conclusion. On a subjectivist account of morality, the Value Claim represents the speaker’s, or the agent’s, attitude towards the underlying property(ies). On a relativist account, the Value Claim expresses the views of a particular culture or society. In either case, the Value Claim is acknowledged as stance-dependent. So too are the moral claims which follow.

But the moral realist does not accept the conclusion. A common realist response is to deny premise (2) by providing and defending an objective account of moral value. There are many methods for doing so. Importantly, MDT does not need to show that those attempts fail.

Moral Decision Theory takes another route. Instead of asking how the Value Claim can be made stance-independent, it asks whether every standard requires that step in the first place. It challenges premise (1).

The basis for this alternate route is a property whose scale is already ordered in the relevant better-to-worse direction – prior to, or independent from, any Value Claim.

That property is experiential quality.

1.2.4 Experiential Quality

Experiential Quality is a property of sentient experience. It refers to how good or how bad an experience is.

Because “good” and “bad” have several different meanings, this definition is easily misunderstood. So it’s worth stepping back and distinguishing between two kinds of representation.

The first is property-specific. It describes an entity by identifying or quantifying one particular property: The object has a volume of 2m³.

The second is a broader assessment of the entity. It provides a description of the entity in virtue of one or more of its properties: The object is beautiful.

Some descriptive statements are ambiguous: “This room is cool.”

The word “cool” might refer to the temperature of the room, identifying a particular physical property. Alternatively, it might express an assessment of the room’s appearance or design. In the latter case, the room is being assessed in virtue of its properties; in the former, one of those properties is simply being described.

Next consider statements which refer to an experience. Property Specific: That perceptual experience was vivid. Broader Assessment: That perceptual experience was worthwhile.

Ambiguous: That experience was good.

Like “cool”, the terms “good” and “bad” can also be used in different ways. When we say that an experience was good, we might be assessing it according to some evaluative standard – in virtue of its other properties.

But “good” can also be used in a property-specific sense. It identifies one feature of the experience itself – its Experiential Quality. It does not mean that the experience was morally valuable, desirable, instrumentally beneficial, or worthy of approval. It means that this particular experience had a positive Experiential Quality.

Experiences are often discussed by their labels: joy, fear, pride, anxiety, and so on. But dispense with those categories for a moment, and consider the properties of an experience instead: duration, intensity, vividness, arousal, and so on.

One of those properties of experience is its positive or negative character. So a claim like “The fear I felt was bad” can provide a description of that experiential quality without giving an overall assessment of the fear. It plays the same semantic role as “The fear I felt was brief”. Each refers to an isolated feature of the experience.

Of course, I may approve or disapprove of the fear. It may have a moral or an instrumental value. But those assessments are distinct from the experience’s negative character. More importantly, they are absent from the content of the property-specific claim “The fear I felt was bad”.

The positive or negative character of experience has been discussed under labels such as phenomenal valence and hedonic tone. Moral Decision Theory uses the broader term Experiential Quality for the dimension of experience with which we are concerned here.

1.2.5 Order to Rank

As detailed in the introduction, Moral Decision Theory is focused solely on the Endorsement Claim.

Endorsement Claim: θ is the best option in terms of Standard X

MDT neither affirms nor denies any Value Claim. But that does raise the question of how an option can be identified as best without depending upon a separate Value Claim.

In the typical case, entities can be ordered along an unoriented scale. To turn that ordering into a ranking from better to worse, an evaluative orientation must be overlaid upon it. That requires a Value Claim.

But Experiential Quality is different.

The scale of Experiential Quality is internally oriented in terms of better and worse. One direction is good, and the other bad, but not by any external claim. So an ordering of experiences by this property is not a neutral comparison, but a ranking from better to worse.

For example, a comparative claim might identify Experience A as higher than Experience B on a scale of Experiential Quality. Because of the orientation of that scale, the comparison also identifies Experience A as better, in that respect, than Experience B.

We can now move from comparing and ranking experiences to comparing and ranking options.

As discussed in Section 1.2.1, options can be ordered along a scale. Suppose an agent faces five options. Each option corresponds to a possible course of subsequent events, including experiences undergone by the agent and others. To compare and order the options by Experiential Quality, we must consider the aggregate Experiential Quality of those experiences.

That ordering is also a ranking. It could thus support claims such as

  • In terms of experiential quality, Option A is better than Option B
  • In terms of experiential quality, Option C is best

The second claim is therefore not merely a comparative claim, but also an Endorsement Claim. It identifies the best available option according to a standard of Experiential Quality.

If Experiential Quality is stance-independent, the truth of these claims does not depend upon the attitudes or evaluative stance of any individual or group. Options can therefore be ranked by Experiential Quality without first introducing a separate Value Claim.

1.2.6 That’s Just, Like, Your Opinion Man

To close this section, it is worth clarifying what is being claimed – and, importantly, what is not.

First, there is a claim that experiences possess a property which can be positive or negative in character. This property, labelled Experiential Quality, is directly experienced by the subject. For some readers, that claim will seem immediately obvious. For others, it may require further justification. A critic may argue that, at some deeper level, this positive or negative character is constituted by the subject’s attitude towards the experience. That challenge will be addressed separately.

Second, there is a claim that options can be compared according to the aggregate Experiential Quality of the experiences they contain. This raises a further question of stance-dependence if the method of aggregation itself depends upon the attitudes of the evaluator. A defence of stance-independent aggregation will therefore be provided separately. It is better addressed after a detailed account of options is presented in Part 2.

As for what is not being claimed: there is no claim that Experiential Quality is morally valuable. Nor is there a claim that it isn’t. Moral Decision Theory requires neither position. Its claim is simply that an option can be endorsed as best according to a standard of Experiential Quality without that endorsement depending upon any separate Value Claim.

1.3 Moral Facts without Moral Authority

Moral Realism is often described as the view that there are stance-independent moral facts. But consider the following claim

“Many historical societies have regarded slavery as morally permissible”

This claim may be true independently of anyone’s stance. It is also a claim about morality: it describes the moral attitudes and practices of particular societies.

But this is clearly not the kind of stance-independent moral fact at the centre of the debate between Riley and Anton. Their disagreement concerns not merely facts about morality, but normative moral facts.

A normative claim such as “You should not practise slavery” concerns how things should or shouldn’t be, or what we should and shouldn’t do. It differs from a descriptive claim like “Ancient Romans practised slavery”. That simply describes what happened.

Consider again our moral package of three claims.

(1) Value Claim: More of Property/Properties X is better

(2) Endorsement Claim: θ is the best option in terms of Standard X

(3) Authority Claim: We are required to adhere to Standard X

Within this package, the Authority Claim appears to be the source of normativity. It claims that the standard of the Endorsement Claim is binding upon the agent.

Return to the discussion between Riley and Anton. They both agreed that paying the incorrect bill would have been best in terms of their own interests. And they both agreed that paying the higher amount was best in moral terms. Consider then two separate Endorsement Claims

Prudential Endorsement Claim: Paying the lower amount is the best option, according to a Standard of Financial Gain.

Moral Endorsement Claim: Paying the higher amount is the best option, according to a Standard of Honesty.

The two endorsements point in different directions. In such cases, morality is often understood to have a special authority. It is said to override other considerations. This is the additional role played by the Authority Claim. It tells us which standard is binding upon the agent.

1.3.1 The Authority Question

The Authority Claim invites the question posed by Anton, “Why are we required to follow Standard X?”

This question can be illustrated by the familiar game of asking “Why?” – a game played by children of a certain age, and by philosophers of a certain pedantry.

Suppose you tell a child that they should help a younger child with some task.

“Why should I?” they respond.

You might answer that helping others is a moral rule or principle: That “You should help people.” But the ball is immediately volleyed back to your court.

“Why? Why should I follow that moral rule?”

Perhaps you then answer that we should follow that rule because a reasonable and good person would do so. Or perhaps you’ll say because it will create a better world. Or because we would be respecting people’s natural rights.

But where does this game lead?

The chain of justification can only continue in one of three directions. 1. Circularity: At some stage, you return to an earlier claim 2. Infinite Regress: Offering reason after reason, forever and ever 3. Foundationalism: The chain terminates in some claim that does not itself receive further justification.

If stance-independent moral facts require an Authority Claim, we must take one of these three paths. But none seem satisfactory. None appears to answer the Authority Question.

The argument can be stated like this:

1. Objective moral authority requires some foundation for one standard having priority over others.

2. That foundation can only be circular, infinitely regressive, or a primitive normative claim.

3. Each route remains open to a further question about that authority.

The anti-realist may take the argument as reason to reject stance-independent moral facts. Per this view, the binding nature of morality may emerge, for example, from individual attitudes, from shared commitments, or from social practices.

The moral realist, on the other hand, might defend a legitimate stopping point. Perhaps some moral facts are primitive. Perhaps some reasons are fundamental. Perhaps, at some point, we arrive at a normative truth that does not require further justification.

Moral Decision Theory does not need to settle this dispute.

The debate concerns stance-independent moral authority, rather than stance-independent moral facts more generally. For the argument above to reach that wider conclusion, another premise is required: that a stance-independent moral fact must itself possess, contain, or depend upon stance-independent moral authority.

That premise is easily hidden within the argument when the Endorsement Claim and the Authority Claim are treated as a single package. But treated separately, the gap appears. The Endorsement Claim, when understood as isolated from any further claim of authority, is unchallenged by the Authority Question.

1.3.2 King of Standards

You are standing in the queue at your favourite café. In front of you are three philosophers: Immanuel Kant, Aristotle, and Peter Singer. Their friend Confucius is back at the office, and they need to buy him a drink.

Kant says “We should get him a lemonade.” Aristotle says “No. We should get him a ginger tea.” And Peter Singer says: “You’re both wrong. We should get him a coffee.”

The philosophers argue about their respective positions. Kant explains that before they left the office, Confucius had asked for a lemonade. They promised to get him one, so that is the best option.

Aristotle explains that Confucius is feeling unwell with a sore throat. If they get ginger tea, Confucius will feel much better. In terms of virtue, ginger tea is the best option.

Peter Singer has a different view. He points to a sign in the window saying that all of the coffee is fair trade. Buying it will benefit vulnerable farmers in the developing world. To maximise welfare, coffee is the best option.

Each of the philosophers has made an Endorsement Claim, each according to a different standard. “According to a standard of treating others as an end, lemonade is the best option.” “According to a standard of virtue, ginger tea is the best option.” “According to a standard of maximising welfare, coffee is the best option.”

But the argument doesn’t end there.

Kant continues, saying that we have a duty to keep our promises. Aristotle disagrees, saying that we must act in accordance with virtue. Peter Singer argues that we have an obligation to maximise welfare and minimise suffering.

The disagreement is no longer about which drink ranks highest according to a particular standard. The philosophers are now arguing about the standards themselves.

Which standard should take priority? Which standard are we required to follow? Which standard is authoritative?

The philosophers are now making an Authority Claim. “We are required to adhere to a standard of promise-keeping”

“We are required to adhere to a standard of virtue” “We are required to adhere to a standard of maximising welfare”

The Endorsement Claim ranks options within a standard. The Authority Claim concerns the status or priority of the standard itself.

Where standards conflict, an Authority Claim therefore introduces a hierarchy between them. One standard is said to override another, to take priority, or to possess some superior authority.

But this returns us to the Authority Question. Why should that standard take priority?

Suppose you answer this question with a reason – Standard A takes priority over Standards B & C because it most promotes human flourishing. Perhaps Standard A has authority because it’s the most rational of standards. Perhaps it is the one which best promotes equality.

To give a reason for one standard taking priority over others is to endorse a standard itself. Endorsement here involves ranking according to some standard.

Of course, if that privileged status is established by appealing to the same standard, the justification is circular. If it is established by some further standard or principle, the question can be asked again of that higher standard, generating a regress. Alternatively, the hierarchy may terminate in some foundational principle whose authority is not derived from anything further.

These are the same possibilities encountered in the Authority Question: circularity, regress, or foundationalism.

1.3.3 You Should Do What is Best

The philosophers’ argument reached the familiar Authority Question only once they made an Authority Claim. It reached the trilemma because they endorsed a standard as authoritative.

But let’s take a step back. Let’s return to the earlier endorsement of an option.

θ is the best option in terms of Standard X

Consider a non-moral claim in this form:

A1 – In the chess game, the best option is Bishop to C7.

A2 – Before a long drive, the best option is to check your tyre pressure.

A3 – For your investment goals, a diversified portfolio is the best option.

Each claim endorses one option over the available alternatives within a particular context.

Now consider the following:

B1 – In the chess game, Player 1 should move Bishop to C7.

B2 – You should check your tyre pressure before going on a long drive.

B3 – To meet your investment goals, you should hold a diversified portfolio.

Each claim in the second set expresses the same underlying endorsement as its counterpart in the first. A1 identifies Bishop to C7 as the best available move according to the relevant chess standard. B1 expresses that endorsement in normative language.

We have the same semantic rephrasing with the three philosophers. “According to a standard of promise-keeping, we should get lemonade.” “According to a standard of virtue, we should get ginger tea.” “According to a standard of maximising welfare, we should get coffee.”

We have three moral claims. Each endorses an option as being best in moral terms. Their subsequent disagreement concerns something further: the status or priority of those moral claims.

The Endorsement Claim is the normative claim. The Authority Claim is an additional claim about the authority of that normative endorsement. That separation is central to Moral Decision Theory.

We can now bring back the standard of Experiential Quality introduced in Section 1.2. We closed that section with a claim in the following form:

According to a standard of Experiential Quality, θ is the best option.

As established in Section 1.2, this Endorsement Claim is stance-independent because the ranking supplied by Experiential Quality does not depend upon anyone’s attitudes.

Following the discussion above, we can now rephrase that same Endorsement Claim in normative language:

According to a standard of Experiential Quality, the agent should do θ.

The claim is stance-independent for the reasons established in Section 1.2. It is normative because it endorses an option as the one the agent should choose.

A ranking of objects, events, or states of affairs need not be normative. What matters here is that the ranked entities are options available to an agent within a decision. Identifying one of those options as best provides an endorsement of what the agent should choose.

On the account developed here, the normative character of the claim therefore derives from the decision structure itself, rather than from the evaluative or authoritative status of the standard.

The important point is that the word “should” can be introduced without adding an Authority Claim. The Authority Claim does not make the Endorsement Claim normative. It adds a further claim about the status or force of the standard.

Normative endorsement comes first. Authority is an additional step.

1.3.4 You Really Really Should Do What is Best

I opened this section with the idea that morality is generally understood to be normative. We now have a normative claim in the form

According to a standard of Experiential Quality, the agent should do θ.

But the Endorsement Claim itself makes no further claim about the status of the standard embedded within it. The Authority Question (Why should I decide according to a standard of Experiential Quality?) can still be asked, but it does not challenge the content of the Endorsement Claim itself.

A related challenge may therefore be raised. One might accept that the Endorsement Claim is normative, while denying that it is genuinely normative. It tells us what we should do according to a standard, but not what we really should do.

According to this challenge, morality does more than endorse one course of action over another. Moral requirements are supposed to bind us. A genuinely normative moral claim must therefore possess some further authority or normative force.

On this view, the Endorsement Claim is normative – but not normative enough.

To be clear, Moral Decision Theory does not deny that a stance-independent normative Endorsement Claim may possess some further authoritative status. Nor does it deny that an Authority Claim might itself be stance-independent.

In that sense, MDT remains compatible with a range of accounts of the further status or practical force of moral endorsement. That status might involve:

  • stance-independent authority;
  • rationally constructed authority;
  • attitude-dependent authority;
  • expressive or prescriptive practical force;
  • or no further authoritative status at all.

These possibilities represent important disagreements. But Moral Decision Theory does not attempt to settle them.

The discussion of moral authority is therefore not unimportant. MDT simply treats it as separate from the question of whether there are stance-independent normative facts. Those facts have already been identified through the Endorsement Claim. Questions about what further authority, force, or bindingness such a claim possesses arise afterwards.

1.4 The Endorsement Claim

We started Part 1 with the idea that moral theories typically consist of three separate claims.

Value Claim: More of Property/Properties X is better

Endorsement Claim: θ is the best option in terms of Standard X

Authority Claim: We are required to adhere to Standard X

These claims are often treated as a single package. As a consequence, the stance-independence of morality is often taken to rise or fall with the package as a whole. Only if all three of the Value, Endorsement and Authority Claims can be stance-independent, can morality itself be stance-independent.

The first argument made by Moral Decision Theory is that this package can be separated. In particular, we can evaluate whether the Endorsement Claim can be stance-independent or normative without concurrently establishing a stance-independent Value Claim or a normative Authority Claim.

From there, we identified a standard by which the Endorsement Claim can be independent of any personal, cultural or hypothetical attitude: Experiential Quality. This standard orders experiences from better to worse without depending upon any prior Value Claim. As a result, an option can be endorsed as best according to the Experiential Quality of the experiences involved without that endorsement depending upon anyone’s attitudes.

An Endorsement Claim in the form below can thus be stance-independent:

According to a standard of Experiential Quality, θ is the best option.

And finally, we have explained how the Endorsement Claim can be understood as normative, without reference or dependence upon any further Authority Claim. A claim which identifies an option as best (per Standard X) is equivalent to a claim which prescribes the selection of that option (per Standard X). This semantic claim allows for the Endorsement Claim to be rephrased in more overtly normative terms.

According to a standard of Experiential Quality, the agent should do θ.

We have therefore shown how an Endorsement Claim in this form can express a stance-independent normative claim.

1.4.1 Meredith

Riley and Anton are still discussing their views on morality. Their friend Meredith has been listening intently to both perspectives.

Riley: Well, what do you think Meredith? Is it a moral fact that we should have paid the higher amount?

Meredith: Yes, I think it is. But I wouldn’t agree with you, Riley, on what that fact is.

Riley: How so?

Meredith: Well, I’m a Moral Decision Theorist. So I would endorse the same option as each of you. But I wouldn’t use a standard of honesty. I would identify the best option by a standard of Experiential Quality.

Anton: OK, so use a different standard. But what makes Experiential Quality good independently of anyone valuing it?

Anton has made the same challenge against Meredith as he did earlier with Riley. He asks the Value Question.

Meredith: You’ve asked me a Value Question, but I haven’t made a Value Claim. My claim is that paying the higher amount is best according to the Experiential Quality of the experiences involved. But I have not claimed that good experiences possess some further property of moral goodness, or that bad experiences possess some further property of moral badness.

Anton: Then what makes an experience good?

Meredith: Here, “good” and “bad” describe the quality of the experience itself. They do not attribute any further property of moral goodness or badness to that experience.

Anton: But you are still saying that it’s good.

Meredith: But not in the way you’re suggesting. Put it this way – if I see a red object, I can say my experience had a feature of redness. Now if I say, “The redness was good” I’m making a further claim about the value of that property. Similarly, if I experience a moment of joy, I can describe the experience as having a good experiential quality. If I then say, “That good experiential quality is itself good,” I am making a further claim. It isn’t a tautology. The first “good” identifies the positive character of the experience; the second makes a further evaluation of that character. But, let me be clear, I’m not making that second claim.

Anton: So you don’t value good experiences, or the reduction of bad experiences?

Meredith: Of course I value good experiences. But the key point is that my attitude is separate from the content of my claim. The truth of that claim is independent of every actual or hypothetical attitude. It doesn’t rest upon any further claim that good experiential quality is itself valuable – either in an objective or in a subjective sense.

Meredith has explained that her Endorsement Claim does not depend upon any further Value Claim. Because the standard of Experiential Quality is itself independent of any actual or hypothetical attitude, her Endorsement Claim can therefore be stance-independent.

Riley: So if you’re not claiming that good experiences are morally valuable, why should one point out the mistake at the café?

Meredith: Can I clarify your question? Do you mean, why is paying the higher amount the best option in terms of Experiential Quality?

Riley: No. I mean, why are you required to decide according to Experiential Quality?

Meredith: Well, you’re asking me an Authority Question but I haven’t made an Authority Claim. It’s a stance-independent moral fact that you should have paid the higher amount. I’m not adding any further claim that you are required to act in accordance with that moral fact.

Riley: So you don’t act according to a moral duty?

Meredith: Some Moral Decision Theorists might believe in moral duties. But moral obligation is a further question. First, there is the question of which action is morally correct. Second, there is the question of whether we are obliged to perform it. For me personally, I don’t act morally because I must, but because I can.

Next, Meredith has explained that her Endorsement Claim does not depend upon any further Authority Claim. Because the endorsement is already normative, no further claim of binding authority is required for it to prescribe an action.

Riley: I’ve got to say, I’m not quite convinced. There’s no moral value, and there’s no moral authority. It seems like you’re missing something.

Anton: I agree. Perhaps I can accept that your Endorsement Claim is stance-independent. And perhaps I can accept that it’s normative. But what makes it a moral claim?

The discussion has reached its logical next question. In Part 1, I have shown how Moral Decision Theory can identify a stance-independent normative Endorsement Claim without first establishing any further claim of moral value or moral authority. We have separated those questions from the Endorsement Claim. But that prompts a reaction: have we removed too much?

That is the question I address in Part 2. What makes the Endorsement Claim a moral one?